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5.1  The New Deal and Fiscal Centralization 
A cursory look at the course of federal fiscal structure in the United States 
might suggest that the Great Depression and the New Deal merely accelerated 
already existing tendencies toward centralization of the public sector. Indeed, 
at least two of the most insightful political observers of the nineteenth century 
had forecast just such a trend. Alexis de Tocqueville, writing in the first half of 
the century, was convinced that democratic “sentiments” exerted a powerful 
force encouraging the centralization of political power. From his analysis of 
these “natural tendencies,” Tocqueville concludes that  “I am of  the opinion 
that, in the democratic ages which are opening upon us . . . centralization will 
be the natural government” ([1835] 1945, 2:313). 
Later in the century, Lord Bryce, although more circumspect about such a 
broad generalization, reached a similar forecast for the United States. After 
considering both the “centrifugal” and “centripetal” forces at work in Ameri- 
can government, Bryce found that while the centrifugal forces were “likely, as 
far as we can now see, to prove transitory . . .  the centripetal forces are pema- 
nent and secular forces, working from age to age” (1901, 2344). Bryce went 
on to predict that “the importance of the States will decline as the majesty and 
authority of the National government increase” ([1888] 1901,2:844). 
From such a perspective, the New Deal might be seen against the backdrop 
of history as a major event hastening the underlying tendencies toward central- 
ization. But such a view, on closer inspection, is seriously incomplete if  not 
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quite misleading. Even a straightforward examination of the standard measures 
of  fiscal centralization (such as the central government share of  total public 
spending or revenues) does not lend unambiguous support to this view. But, as 
we shall contend, simply looking at such measures of fiscal centralization  pro- 
vides only a superficial view of the evolution of intergovernmental fiscal struc- 
ture in the United States. The New Deal meant much more than just a move- 
ment  toward centralization of  the  public  sector. It  brought  with  it  some 
fundamental and dramatic changes in the very character of American federal- 
ism, changes that would leave a permanent imprint on the intergovernmental 
system. 
In this paper, we explore the impact of the New Deal on the structure and 
workings of U.S. fiscal federalism, drawing on an extensive database on inter- 
governmental fiscal flows. We try to place the New Deal programs in the con- 
text of earlier intergovernmental structure and to follow their legacy into the 
second half of the twentieth century. It is our sense that the New Deal irrevoca- 
bly altered the evolution of American federalism and did this largely through 
the widespread introduction of a fiscal instrument that had seen only modest 
use earlier: intergovernmental grants. The introduction of  major grant pro- 
grams in a form that involved close cooperation between federal and state au- 
thorities marked the end of  a period in which different levels of government 
functioned with a high degree of independence.  To make use of the terminol- 
ogy  of  the political scientists, we moved from a system of  “coordinate” (or 
“dual”) federalism, in which the various levels of government function in rela- 
tively independent spheres, to one of “cooperative” federalism, in which there 
is much more sharing of fiscal functions and greater interplay among levels of 
government in the management and funding of public programs.’ In this way, 
the New Deal set American federalism on a new course that has brought in- 
creasing interaction among levels of government; its legacy is unmistakable. 
Much of our work has involved the careful assembling of the relevant data 
on public expenditures,  revenues, and intergovernmental financial flows. This, 
as we shall see, is a tricky business involving some critical issues of definition, 
timing, and assignment of spending and revenue data. But when properly as- 
sembled and interpreted, the data reveal a striking evolution of the structure of 
the public finances in the United States over the course of the twentieth century. 
While the rise to prominence of the central government is a major feature of 
the fiscal landscape, it does not come primarily at the expense of  state and 
local governments. It is rather part of the growth of the public sector as a whole 
and the extension of  public responsibilities into a number of new functions, 
including a major role in social insurance and the assistance of  low-income 
households. Many of the programs established in the New Deal and certainly 
much of the new “spirit” of cooperative federalism that it introduced were not 
1. See, e.g.,  Geoffrey Sawer (1969) and William Stewart (1984) for discussions of these con- 
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temporary in character; they have become essential elements of fiscal federal- 
ism in the United States over the remainder of the century. We  shall contend 
that without the New  Deal, the course of American federalism would likely 
have been quite different from that which we have experienced. 
5.2  U.S. Fiscal Federalism in the Twentieth Century: An Overview 
To put the New Deal programs in perspective, it is helpful at the outset to 
take a broad look at some summary measures of tendencies in U.S. fiscal feder- 
alism over the present century. Table 5.1 reports the shares of public expendi- 
ture of federal, state, and local government for selected years. In addition, the 
table indicates for those years the share of the public sector in GNP and the 
percentage of  revenues of  state and local government coming from national 
intergovernmental grants. 
The numbers reveal some important tendencies in U.S. fiscal size and struc- 
ture. Three such trends are of particular importance for us. First, we see that 
over this century the government sector as a whole has grown in size relative 
to the economy. At the turn of the century, public spending accounted for only 
8 percent of GNP; this had grown to 38 percent by  1992 (where the consider- 
able difference in revenue and expenditure shares is the result of deficit financ- 
Table 5.1  Government Fiscal Measures, 1902-92 
Total Expenditures  Total Government as a  Federal Grants 
Share by Level (%)  Share of GNP (9%)  as a Share of State 
and Local 
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ing). Second, we  find a striking trend in the public sector toward increased 
fiscal centralization. This trend is evident both in the growing role of the fed- 
eral government and in the expansion of  state governments relative to their 
local counterparts. In 1902, for instance, the federal share in public expendi- 
ture was only 34 percent; local government accounted for the lion’s share, 58 
percent, of public expenditure in the United States. These shares have changed 
dramatically over the course of the century, with the federal and state sectors 
expanding at the expense of local government. By 1992, federal, state and local 
shares were 58, 18, and 24 percent, respectively. And third, we see an  im- 
portant change in the pattern of finance within the public sector. At the begin- 
ning of the century, state and local reliance on federal grants was minuscule; 
in  1902 less than  1 percent of  state and local revenues came from transfers 
from the federal government. Now, of course, federal intergovernmental trans- 
fers are a major feature of the fiscal landscape; in 1992, for example, federal 
grants accounted for 21.4 percent of gross state-local revenues. 
In thinking about the role of the New Deal in this process, it is helpful to 
look more closely at table 5.1 to see what it suggests about the rate of change 
of these variables during the 1930s. Certain important fiscal changes stand out. 
First, although government’s  share of GNP does increase during the 1930s, this 
growth is not abnormally rapid. Government’s share of GNP slightly less than 
doubled between 1902 and 1922, and it slightly less than doubled again be- 
tween 1922 and 1940. Although the comparison can be affected by the choice 
of years, if we take the period from 1913 to 1927 and compare it to the period 
from 1927 to 1940, we get roughly the same effect.*  We see continuing growth 
in the public sector in the 1930s, but not an accelerating growth. Second, what 
does stand out about the 1930s is the sharp increase in the national share of 
government activity. Accepting that  1922 and  1946 (and to a lesser extent 
1952) are exceptional postwar years, the national share of public expenditure 
prior to 1934 was roughly 30 percent, while after 1952 it had risen to about 60 
percent. The local share, which was roughly 60 percent before the 1930s, fell 
to about 25 percent, while the state share rose from approximately 10 percent 
to 18 percent. Third, we see that in 1934 federal intergovernmental grants sud- 
denly became an important source of revenue for state and local governments. 
And this new feature of the fiscal system became permanent (with certain war- 
time exceptions), with federal transfers accounting for a significant share of 
state-local revenues over the second half of the twentieth century. 
This overview of fiscal trends provides some perspective on the historical 
impact of the New Deal. But before turning to a more detailed examination of 
the changing fiscal structure of the U.S. federal system, it is important to treat 
at least briefly some fundamental issues regarding the data. As we  shall see, 
2. The data for 1922 include relatively large interest expenditures for the federal government. 
This manifesis itself in table 5.1 in the large central share of expenditures in 1922. 159  The Impact of the New Deal on American Federalism 
the various measures of  government growth and structure depend in critical 
ways on just how the data are assembled and interpreted. Much of our effort 
in this study has involved a careful analysis of the data themselves and how 
they are to be understood. We find that it is impossible to get an accurate sense 
of the significance of the New Deal from these data without addressing some 
key issues of definition and timing. 
5.3  Some Basic Issues Concerning the Fiscal Data 
Although some partial information on public finances had been collected 
since 1850, the first complete “census of  governments” in the United States 
was undertaken in 1902. Subsequent censuses were taken in 1913,1922,1932, 
and 1942, but the coverage of these later censuses varied, leaving some serious 
gaps in the fiscal data. In  1950, the Congress enacted legislation providing 
for a quinquennial census in years ending in “2”  and “7,” but funds were not 
appropriated for  1952. Since 1957, a census of  governments has been con- 
ducted every five years. 
In spite of these problems with the infrequency and erratic coverage of the 
census of governments in the first half of the century, it is possible to construct 
consistent and reliable estimates of national aggregates for national, state, and 
local fiscal activity for most years. The census of  governments regularly up- 
dates the twentieth-century figures in volumes entitled Historical Statistics on 
Government Finance and Employment. We begin with these data but examine 
several important modifications in the way the accounts can be presented.’ 
The issue before us is the structure of American government over the long 
term, and the selection of the years we chose is critical. Both world wars and 
the depression left deep footprints in the government data. Wars caused enor- 
mous increases in federal government military expenditures, financed in part 
by  taxes and in part by borrowing. Debt repayment lingered in the record for 
decades. The Great Depression likewise had a major impact, in this instance 
leading to a sharp reduction in federal government revenues. Unfortunately, 
two of  the benchmark census years, 1932 and 1942, are profoundly affected 
by depression and war. The use of these years can thus introduce some serious 
distortion when trying to develop a perspective both on the fiscal trends over 
the longer period and on the impact of the Great Depression. It is interesting 
in this respect that by the 1982 census of governments, the authors of the His- 
torical  Statistics volume chose not to present data for 1932 or 1942; instead 
they chose the years 1927, 1934, 1940, and 1946. This selection conveniently 
straddles the Great Contraction and the worst of  the war years. We  have fol- 
lowed their selection, but it is important to point out that, for some purposes, 
3. We will gladly provide interested readers with an appendix, describing the census sources 
and alternative ways of measuring government activity, that contains detailed tables. 160  John Joseph Wallis and Wallace E. Oates 
the selection of other years is more appropriate. The patterns and changes in 
the fiscal aggregates can look quite different depending on the years that are 
chosen. 
A second issue revolves around the categories of  federal expenditure that 
we include when computing the fiscal shares of the different levels of govern- 
ment. The federal government has widely varying and large expenditure com- 
mitments to the military and increasingly for interest on its debt. But for the 
purpose of measuring the relative shares of the federal, state, and local sectors 
in carrying out domestic programs, it often makes sense to exclude federal 
spending on national defense and on interest payments from total expenditure 
and to focus attention on the shares for domestic expenditure programs. This 
adjustment can also make a major difference in our reading of both the pattern 
and trends in fiscal centralization in the United States. 
A third critical issue concerns a basic ambiguity in the way  in which the 
relative fiscal sizes of  the different levels of  government are measured. This 
involves the treatment of  intergovernmental grants. Although this issue is of 
minor importance early in the century, it looms much larger as these grants 
become a major feature of the intergovernmental fiscal system. The issue con- 
cerns the attribution of  these grants to the revenues and expenditures of  the 
different levels of governments. Gross revenue and expenditure totals involve 
substantial double-counting. And the way in which we choose to adjust for this 
double-counting affects our picture of what happened over the century. 
There are basically two choices: to attribute grants to the grantor or to the 
recipient. On  the revenue side, grants are typically credited to the granting 
government. Under this approach, grants received by  state or local govern- 
ments are deleted from their gross revenues. Thus state and local revenues will 
include only the funds that they themselves raise through their own taxes, fees, 
and borrowing. These are often referred to as “own revenues.” 
Expenditure measures typically attribute grants to the recipient, the level at 
which they are actually spent. Using this definition, intergovernmental grants 
are excluded from the expenditures of the granting government and remain in 
the expenditures of the re~ipient.~  Thus, it will be important, as we shall see, 
whether we  measure the fiscal shares of  the different levels of  government 
by  the monies they raise (revenue shares) or by  the monies that they spend 
(expenditure shares). 
The importance of these alternative measures can be seen by looking closely 
at the measure of expenditure used by  the National Income and Product Ac- 
counts (NIPA). They report “expenditures from own funds,” an expenditure 
measure that attributes expenditures for grants to the granting government. 
Figure 5.1 depicts the share of  total domestic expenditures at each level of 
government using the more traditional measure of expenditures, while figure 
4. In fact, it would be virtually impossible to exclude certain lump-sum grants to governments 
from the recipient’s expenditures given the fungibility of such monies with own revenues. 161  The Impact of the New Deal on American Federalism 
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Fig. 5.1 
to receiving government, 1902-92 
Sources;  1902-82,  U.S.  Census of  Governments (1985);  1987 and 1992, Advisory Council on 
Intergovernmental Relations (1995). 
Nore; Federal domestic expenditures are total federal expenditures minus expenditures for de- 
fense, international relations, and interest on the government debt. 
Shares of domestic expenditures: intergovernmental grants attributed 
5.2 shows the shares based on the NIPA  own-funds definition. Each  figure 
incorporates data for the years listed in table 5.1.5 
The reversal of the national  and local shares in figure 5.1  occurs in the 
1940s, while this reversal of  national and local shares occurs in the 1930s in 
figure 5.2. The reason for the difference between the two graphs is straightfor- 
ward. During the 1930s the central government incurred what for these times 
were relatively large peacetime deficits, while state and local governments ac- 
tually ran surpluses. Revenues from new borrowing are not counted as reve- 
nues in the traditional measures, nor is retirement of principal included in ex- 
penditures. Since a large part  of the growth in central fiscal activity in the 
1930s took the form of intergovernmental grants, what the expenditures-from- 
own-funds measure (N1PA)picks up as an increase in the size of the central 
government during the 1930s is missed by the more traditional measure. And 
since most of  the increased central expenditures were financed through bor- 
rowing, revenue measures produce results like those in figure 5.1. 
5. As we noted, the selection of years excludes the massive military buildup in World War 11. 
Including the war years would introduce a bulge in the federal share in both figures but would not 




Figures 5.1 and 5.2 illustrate the importance of keeping definitions straight. 
Compare the national and local shares after 1940 in the two figures. In figure 
5.1, where grants are credited to the receiving government, local expenditures 
are roughly equal to national expenditures until the late 1970s. In figure 5.2, 
where grants are credited to the granting government, the domestic expendi- 
tures of the national government not only exceed those of local government by 
1940, but the difference continues to grow, with some interruptions, for the 
remainder of the century. The relative fiscal importance of national and local 
governments over the last half-century is critically dependent on how one attri- 
butes intergovernmental grants. 
5.4  U.S. Federal Fiscal Structure in the Early Twentieth Century 
As we saw in table 5.1, the fiscal role of the federal government at the turn 
of the century was tiny. The federal government tended to operate in its own 
sphere of activity encompassing national defense, foreign relations, the postal 
service, and various judicial functions. States and their local governments pro- 163  The Impact of the New Deal on American Federalism 
vided the bulk of public services including public education, police protection, 
roads and sanitation, public welfare, and health and hospitals. Moreover, the 
state and local sectors funded their expenditures almost exclusively from their 
own sources. Federal grants were less than 1 percent of state and local revenues 
as late as 1913. 
There had always been some central aid to state and local governments, be- 
ginning with the national assumption of state debts in the 1790s. But intergov- 
ernmental grants in existence by  1900 were a small part of the public sector. 
They included textbooks for the blind (1  879), agricultural experiment stations 
(1887), state soldiers’ homes (1888), resident instruction in land grant colleges 
(1890), and irrigation (1894). These were followed by  grants to state marine 
schools (191  1), state and forestry operations (191  l), the agricultural extension 
service  (1914), vocational  education  (1917),  and  vocational  rehabilitation 
(1920). But these programs were, by  1920, overshadowed in fiscal terms by 
the highway construction grants begun in 1916. By  1922, $92 million of the 
$11 8 million in federal grants, or 78 percent, was for highways. A maternity 
and infancy health plan was begun in  1921, which gave rise to the famous 
decision in Massachusetts  v.  MeZZon  (262 U.S. 447 [1923]) that conditional 
grants did not impinge on state sovereignty, since states were free to forgo 
the grants. By  1930 there were 15 federal grant programs to state and local 
governments in operation, dominated by  the highway construction grants. But 
they were still small in the aggregate; state grants to local governments were 
about five times as large as federal grants to state and local governments com- 
bined. 
The federal system in the early part of  the century was one in which the 
central government operated largely independently of the state-local sector. It 
might be reasonably described, drawing on the political science literature, as 
“coordinate” or “dual” federalism. Lord Bryce provided a nice metaphor for 
this view when he described the federal system as “a great factory wherein two 
sets of machinery are at work, their revolving wheels apparently intermixed, 
their bands crossing one another, yet  each set doing its own work  without 
touching or hampering the other” ([1888] 1901,325). But the New Deal would 
change all this. 
5.5  The Transformation of the Federal Fiscal System under the 
New Deal 
Keeping track of national, state, and local government programs and activity 
during the Great Depression is complicated. During the contractionary phase 
from 1930 to 1932, national government revenues fell from $4,057 million to 
$1,923 million, while the national debt rose by  $3,302 million (numbers are 
given in table 5.2, panel A). As noted earlier, this dependence on borrowing 
throughout the 1930s has to be accounted for when we calculate the shares of 164  John Joseph Wallis and Wallace E.  Oates 
Table 5.2  National Government Fiscal Activity, 1929-40 
(million current dollars) 
A. Revenues, Outlays, and Debt 
Gross  Outlays - 
National  National  National  Change  Outlays 
Revenues  Outlays  Debt  in Debt  in 1933 
Year  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
1929 
1930 
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Sources: Panel A, US.  Bureau of the Census (1975); panel B, Wallis (1984). 
government activity undertaken  at each level. Traditional revenue measures, 
which exclude borrowed funds, tend to understate the growth of the national 
government during the New Deal. 
Likewise, the procedures used in the census of governments for classifying 
New Deal programs are misleading. These procedures label as grant programs 
those that make “indirect expenditures” in contrast to programs involving “di- 
rect expenditures.” But even this classification was not applied entirely consis- 165  The Impact of the New  Deal on American Federalism 
tently over the decade. As we will discuss in more detail shortly, expenditures 
in the earliest New  Deal programs were heavily weighted toward relief pro- 
grams, particularly the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA). 
After 1935 FERA was replaced by a combination of the Works Progress (later 
Projects) Administration (WPA), the categorical relief programs, and the un- 
employment insurance program created by the Social Security Act. Funds ex- 
pended under the WPA were, technically, national government direct expendi- 
tures (not grants) because the WPA  “employed” its relief recipients directly. 
Moreover, since WPA projects were typically for construction of various types 
(e.g., schools, highways, and parks), WPA expenditures were not classified by 
the census as relief or public assistance expenditures; instead, they were as- 
signed to other functional categories, primarily natural resources.6 
Panel B offers an alternative measure of  grant activity and the functional 
distribution of these grants. Column (6) provides the census total for national 
government grants by fiscal year. Column (7) gives the total of national expen- 
ditures in programs “administered cooperatively with states.” The remaining 
columns give grants in cooperative programs by major function. 
Keeping in mind that fiscal 1933 ended on 30 June 1933, national govern- 
ment outlays in 1933 were primarily the result of the Hoover administration.’ 
Column (5) of table 5.2 gives the difference in national government outlays in 
each of  the New Deal years compared with fiscal 1933. The total increase in 
national government outlays over 1933 levels was $21,769 million (in current 
dollars). Of that increase, $16,155 million went for grants in relief programs, 
75 percent of the total. Total expenditures in cooperatively administered pro- 
grams rose by  $27,414 million. This total was larger than the rise in total ex- 
penditures. It indicates how important cooperative programs had become to 
the national government, which actually reduced the “noncooperative” part of 
its activities after 1933. 
Some programs were  more  cooperative than  others. Of  the  four major 
groups shown in table 5.2, both relief  and highways consisted primarily of 
programs that were jointly funded but that were administered by the state or 
local government, even the WPA  with its odd accounting.8  Agricultural price 
supports and other programs initiated under the Agricultural Adjustment Act 
(AAA) of  1933 were funded entirely by  the national government and rarely 
involved the financial participation of  state and local governments. But the 
AAA programs were often administered locally by  county extension agents. 
For example, although crop allocations were determined nationally, within lo- 
cal areas the awarding of contracts was done by extension agents and commit- 
6. These  issues are discussed  in detail  in  Wallis (1984) and in  U.S. Bureau  of  the Census 
7. A small amount of New Deal grants were made in May and June 1933, particularly for relief 
8. There were exceptions. The Civilian Conservation Corps was a relief program run entirely 
(1955,5-7). 
under FERA. 
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tees of  local farmers. Finally, public works programs involved a mix of  na- 
tional, state, and local arrangements. At one end were purely national projects 
under the Public Works Administration and at the other the direct grants made 
to local governments for public housing. 
The New  Deal programs with the largest effect on state and local govern- 
ments  were  the relief  programs. This was not only the result of  the large 
amount of funds expended for relief but also because work relief programs like 
the WPA made a significant contribution to a number of state and local func- 
tions through construction activity: education, highways, parks, and natural 
resources. Understanding the relief programs is central to understanding inter- 
governmental relations during the  1930s. These programs had both a major 
economic and a psychological impact. In fiscal 1934, the national government 
made over $2 billion in grants to state and local governments for relief, which 
in turn made more than $2 billion in relief grants to needy individuals and 
families. In  1933, $2 billion was 4 percent of  GNP. Imagine what the effect 
would be today if the national government announced it would pass out $240 
billion (4 percent of  1996 GNP) in relief to needy individuals, who need only 
apply to their local (typically county) relief office to see whether they qualified. 
And this in the depths of the nation’s greatest depression. 
Whereas granting $2 billion a year for relief was an unprecedented act of 
government largesse, it also created the possibility of unprecedented political 
patronage for the politicians in control of  the money. The administration of 
public relief had always been intertwined with the issue of graft.9 Professional 
social workers were themselves deeply disturbed by  the “politics” of  relief. 
This partially explains the existence of two major professional organizations, 
the more prestigious of which had a membership of private sector social work- 
ers. When FDR appointed Harry Hopkins to head FERA in May  1933, it was 
not at all clear what the organization of relief would look like in coming years 
(see Brown 1940). 
The FERA legislation made it clear that FERA was to restrict itself to mak- 
ing grants to state governments. Half of the original $500 million appropriation 
was to be allocated among the states on the basis of matching grants. But the 
other half of the appropriation was to be allocated at the discretion of the relief 
administrator on the basis of need. The discretionary grants posed a problem 
for Hopkins: if he gave larger grants to states that spent less of their own (or 
local) funds, then states had an incentive to reduce their contributions. But the 
discretion allowed to him by Congress enabled him also to do the opposite, to 
reduce grants to states that made smaller contributions. The threat, and in a 
9. As Howard put it, “So accustomed have the American people become to the infiltration of 
venal politics in many areas of public service, that doubt is frequently expressed whether public 
relief and politics can ever be divorced completely enough to assure decent care to those who are 
really in need and to prevent dissipation of  resources among political favorites. As a result, there 
has been a great reluctance by many persons to expand relief programs lest they  serve only to 
extend spheres of  influence of corrupt political practices” ([1943] 1973.49). 167  The Impact of the New Deal on American Federalism 
few cases the reality, that Hopkins would reduce national grants encouraged 
states to spend more of their own funds. State and local expenditures for relief 
expanded markedly after 1933. In extreme cases, the FERA  legislation gave 
Hopkins the authority to “federalize” relief and take over the administration of 
relief in a state. This occurred seven times1” 
State governors, glad to get the national grants, were not happy to have Hop- 
kins announce that grants would be reduced if  the state government did not 
come up with a larger relief appropriation. State officials expressed their dis- 
pleasure actively. Governor Davey of Ohio actually had an arrest warrant sworn 
out for Hopkins after he had charged Davey with using relief for political pur- 
poses. 
The original FERA appropriation had been $500 million for two years, and 
FERA was in charge of the nation’s entire relief effort. By  the end of  1933, 
however, the funds were running low. Congress continued to appropriate funds 
for FERA on an emergency basis. FERA made roughly $2 billion a year in 
grants between May  1933 and August 1935.“ After the initial matching grants 
were exhausted, all further grants were discretionary The grants were condi- 
tional, and FERA  promulgated an extensive set of  regulations covering how 
relief programs were to be administered. Hopkins was able to enforce several 
simple and important regulations; for example, all relief funds had to be spent 
through public agencies. But FERA’s ability to affect personnel policies and 
recipient selection criteria was limited. As Williams (1  939) noted, the ability 
to enforce these policies was much greater in states where the national contri- 
bution was larger.I2 
Like many  New  Deal programs, FERA was  an emergency program,  in- 
tended to pass with time. Although FERA was given additional funds several 
times, Roosevelt and Hopkins were working on a more permanent solution to 
the relief problem. The Committee on Economic Security (CES), chaired by 
Frances Perkins, the secretary of  labor, and of which Hopkins was member, 
began drafting a plan for an Economic Security Act (ESA) that would ulti- 
mately create the social security system. In his state of the union address in 
January 1935, Roosevelt announced that the national government “must and 
will quit this business of relief” and sent the committee report to Congress. A 
strong case can be made that the Social Security Act was the most important 
legislation not only of the decade but of the century. 
As it emerged from Congress, the act created three basic welfare programs. 
First, it introduced what we now call social security: old-age insurance (OAI, 
now  OASDI) was a nationally administered program of  old-age insurance. 
10. The logic of  how Hopkins could use discretionary grants to pry  more funds out of  state 
1  I. The $2 billion a year figure includes the amount spent by the Civil Works Administration in 
12. For a discussion of the rules and regulations, and their enforceability, see Williams (1939) 
governments is developed in Wallis (1991). 
the winter of  1933. 
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Second, the act established a program of  unemployment insurance (UI). UI 
was funded through a 3 percent payroll tax, 2.9 percent of payrolls to be auto- 
matically credited to state UI trust funds in  any state with an approved UI 
program. States were given wide latitude in setting up their programs. The third 
set of programs was categorical assistance: old-age assistance (OAA), aid to 
the blind, and aid to dependent children (ADC, the forerunner of aid to families 
with dependent children [AFDC]). Categorical programs were to be adminis- 
tered by  the states and funded through automatic matching grants. National 
grants were open ended, but grants per relief case were capped. Although the 
independent Social Security Board created by  the act had  to approve each 
state’s categorical program, there were strict limits on the board’s ability to 
interfere with the actual administration of  the programs. For example, the 
board was explicitly forbidden from withholding grants because of personnel 
decisions at the state level. 
The legislation submitted to Congress proposed each of  these three pro- 
grams but would have administered them in far different ways. The OAI pro- 
gram was national, but the categorical programs would have been administered 
by  FERA, or a FERA-like agency, using discretionary rather than matching 
grants. The discretionary grants did not make it through the first committee 
hearings in the House. It was the strong state control over the categorical relief 
and UI programs, along with the fact that general relief (i.e., care of the needy 
who did not fit into one of the other categories) was left completely to state 
and local governments, that caused such a strong outcry among the social work 
professionals. “Returning relief to the states” was something they vigorously 
opposed.13  Hopkins, who had gone to the professional social workers’ meet- 
ings in 1934 as a hero, came to the meetings in  1935 as a goat. Social work 
professionals opposed returning relief to the states because they saw that as 
returning control to the politicians. Hopkins, in fact, had been trained as a 
social worker and had done everything he could to improve relief administra- 
tion in his tenure as the FERA administrator. 
Understanding why the social security system was set up as it was is critical 
to understanding the New Deal’s legacy and position in the political and eco- 
nomic history of the century. With the addition of Medicaid and Medicare in 
1967, the social security system remains in place in an expanded form. In 
1992, expenditures for social insurance, unemployment insurance, and public 
assistance were one-quarter of  total government expenditures (at all levels). 
Medicaid was set up as a categorical assistance program, with matching grants 
and state administration. Medicare was set up like old-age insurance, with na- 
tional administration and standards. 
13. This story is told in a number of places. Brock (1988) and Bremer (1984) are very good on 
the details. The notion that returning relief to the states was an attempt to return control of the 
relief programs to local economic elites is elaborated in Piven and Cloward (1971) and Block et 
al. (1987). For a reformulation of  this hypothesis based on the interest of Southern legislators, see 
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There are several places we  can turn to find evidence on the motives of 
Congress and the president in 1935. One is to note the incredible opportunities 
that relief (and indeed all of the New Deal programs) offered for political pa- 
tronage. Johnson and Libecap (1994) have pointed out that the New  Deal is 
the one significant period since the Pendleton Act created the civil service sys- 
tem that the portion of national government employees who were not classified 
as civil service actually rose. Roosevelt and Hopkins asked Congress to put the 
relief program’s administrative employees under the civil service, but Congress 
refused until 1939. The attraction of patronage was simply too strong for the 
new Democratic majorities who had been out of power for decades. Johnson 
and Libecap (1994) argue that civil service reform was adopted in the first 
place because the cost of monitoring patronage employees had grown larger 
than the benefits from hiring them. Roosevelt and Hopkins learned this quickly 
during the New Deal. By  1935 Governor Langer of North Dakota was in jail 
for manipulating relief programs. While FDR  stood to gain the most from 
thankful relief recipients, he also stood to lose the most when political abuses 
of relief were uncovered. Hopkins’s attempts to eliminate political manipula- 
tion through rules and regulations, control over hiring, or civil service status for 
administrative  employees was contingent on his ability to coerce states through 
discretionary grants. But this was effectively countered by congressional poli- 
cies that located administrative control, particularly over personnel policies, at 
the state level. 
Additional evidence can be found in the sister legislation to the ESA. FDR 
submitted another piece of relief legislation to Congress in the winter of 1935, 
the Emergency Relief Appropriations Act (ERAA) of  1935. Under the ERAA, 
Congress appropriated $4.8 billion for relief of the unemployed, to be spent 
through agencies that the president was authorized to create via executive order 
through methods not specified in the act. If the ESA was an attempt by  Con- 
gress to secure state administrative control over the permanent part of the wel- 
fare system, the ERAA was an admission by  Congress that for the remainder 
of the depression, the president would be allowed to exercise his discretionary 
powers to deal with the unemployment problem. Under the act’s  authority, 
Roosevelt created the WPA, the Rural Electrification Administration, and sev- 
eral smaller agencies. 
Because of the unusual way it was created, the WPA could have been admin- 
istered in any way that Roosevelt wanted. As we noted earlier, the fact that the 
WPA  was a national program created some problems in the way its expendi- 
tures were treated, both in terms of grants and functions. In practice, however, 
and with a few important exceptions, the WPA was administered cooperatively 
with the states and came to be more cooperative as time went on. The two 
administrative mechanisms by which this cooperation was insured were proj- 
ect sponsorship and recipient selection. 
Hopkins became the WPA’s  administrator, and he continued the FERA pol- 
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Although  regulations  regarding  project  sponsorship went  through  several 
changes after 1935, the basic structure was always the same. WPA  projects 
were initiated by a sponsoring government, which could be local, state, or na- 
tional, forwarded to the state WPA  office for recommendation for approval, 
and then forwarded to the Washington office for final authorization. Between 
July 1935 and August 1937, 96 percent of all WPA  projects were sponsored 
by local or state  government^.'^ “Federal projects” were sponsored by the WPA 
itself, the most prominent of which were in the arts. After 1939 all federal 
projects  were  eliminated,  and  Congress insisted on  a  strict proportion of 
matching funds from sponsors of  at least 25  percent of  project ~0st.I~  The 
growing importance of sponsor contributions and the initiation of most WPA 
projects by  local and state governments ensured a great deal of cooperation 
within the program. 
Cooperation was even more pronounced in the selection of WPA recipients. 
Although the WPA was free to hire its own administrative employees and su- 
pervisory employees (though sponsors also had some say in supervisory em- 
ployees), in order for an unemployed worker to obtain WPA  employment he 
first had to be certified as needy by the local relief agency. The WPA could not 
go out and provide relief to members of the community that the local govern- 
ment had not certified. Unlike the sponsorship policy, the WPA  ultimately 
wished  to  control the  certification process. Congress would  not  authorize 
money for the WPA to do this, however.I6 
Project sponsorship and recipient selection demonstrate the extent to which 
intergovernmental cooperation pervaded the nominally “national” administra- 
tion of the WPA. They also show that two forces were at work to produce such 
cooperation during the New  Deal. First, the WPA  itself sought cooperation 
from state and local governments to enable it to do its job more effectively. 
State and local governments were important sources of funds, administrative 
talent, and local expertise. By utilizing state and local cooperation, the WPA 
strengthened those governments even as it expanded its own role. Second, co- 
operation often gave state and local governments a measure of  control over 
national administration. As such, cooperative policies were often mandated (or 
protected) by  Congress even in the face of presidential opposition, as was the 
case with recipient certification. State and local independence was extremely 
valuable to congressmen. 
In summary, the New  Deal initiated a pattern of  cooperative intergovern- 
mental activity with a distinctive bent: fiscal centralization and administrative 
decentralization. Not only were New Deal programs administered at the state 
14. These figures are taken  from Howard ([I9431  1973, 145). Howard provides an excellent 
history of the WPA. 
15. Sponsor contributions to total WPA  project costs were  10 percent in  1936, 14.7 percent 
in  1937, 21.4 percent in  1938, 19.3 percent in  1939, and 26 percent in  1940 (Howard  [I9431 
1973, 149). 
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level,  but  state  governments  in  particular possessed  real  decision-making 
power. It was states, more than welfare recipients, who were entitled to cate- 
gorical relief under the Social Security Act. State and local governments had 
their say in what projects the WPA  would undertake, and by  the end of  the 
decade, the WPA could not build projects without state and local sponsorship 
and a 25 percent contribution. There were important differences between pro- 
grams. The agricultural programs were cooperative, but state and local govern- 
ments never became directly involved in their operation. The Civilian Conser- 
vation Corps, in contrast, was a national program, as were many public works 
projects. On the other hand, the WPA  was a very important way  that the na- 
tional government financed education, water and sewers, parks, and highways. 
And  the old highway  programs continued their cooperative structure from 
1916. 
5.6  The New Deal and the States 
One other point needs to be addressed. Although the national government 
increased its share of  total government activity during the New  Deal, by  no 
measure was the state share of government activity reduced. The state share of 
total government revenues from own sources rose from 16.4 percent in 1927, 
to 21.7 percent in 1934, to 28.2 percent in 1940.  The state share of total govern- 
ment expenditures rose from 13 percent in 1927, to 16.8 percent in  1934, to 
17.5 percent in 1940 (the own-expenditure shares are even higher). All of the 
growth in the national shares come at the expense of local governments. The 
reason for this is clear. National grants were given primarily to the states. Most 
of these grants offered incentives for state governments to increase their own 
spending. Whether these incentives were explicit, like the strict matching pro- 
visions in the categorical relief programs, or implicit as in Hopkins’s use of 
FERA grants, they were real. Wallis (1984) found that, in the late 1930s, every 
dollar of  national grants increased state expenditures from own revenues by 
$0.3 1. At the same time combined state and national grants actually reduced 
local government expenditures. Similar effects are found in a longer analysis 
of grants and state and local fiscal activity (Wallis 1997). 
Where did these state revenues come from? In 1930, 16 states had individual 
income taxes, 17 had corporate income taxes, and none had a general sales tax. 
During the 1930s, 16 states added personal income taxes, 15 added corporate 
income taxes, and 24 created a sales tax. It is impossible to say that these taxes 
were the result of New Deal grant programs because the majority of new state 
taxes were put in place in  1933 at the same time that the New  Deal grant 
programs were just getting under way.  But one of  the legacies of  the New 
Deal was a much stronger state government sector with new and more flexible 
tax instruments. 
Another way to see this is in the structure of  state government programs. In 
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and had state relief agencies. By the end of  1933, all 48 states did. By  1939 all 
the states had approved UI schemes, and almost all had approved OAA, ADC, 
and aid to the blind programs in place. State highway boards were the result of 
the 1916 grants, but they too were still in place. 
The New  Deal’s  predilection for decentralized administration resulted in 
stronger and larger state governments. 
5.7  Federal Fiscal Evolution Subsequent to the New Deal 
The New Deal created a new and major role for the federal government in 
domestic policy and set intergovernmental fiscal relations in the United States 
on a new course of joint responsibility for both the funding and the manage- 
ment of public programs. Since World War 11, this course has involved not only 
the expansion and extension of certain New  Deal programs but also the cre- 
ation of new forms of  cooperative enterprise, some of which have flourished 
and others of which have proved much less successful. In this section, we ex- 
plore briefly this later experience in order to provide some sense of what the 
New Deal might have bequeathed to us. 
The war, of course, had a dramatic impact on American government. During 
the fighting, the role of  the national government expanded enormously, and 
both state and local government shrank in absolute terms. The war,  and its 
employment policies, eliminated the need for the New Deal’s emergency relief 
programs, and the permanent programs became much less important. 
During the 1950s the national government returned to more active support 
for highway construction through the National Defense Highway Act in 1956, 
which began the interstate system. From  1952 to  1962, national grants for 
highway construction rose from $415 million to $2,748 million. The interstate 
system was built cooperatively, with states supervising the planning and con- 
struction in conjunction with national guidelines and direction. National grants 
for public welfare and education rose slowly in the 1950s, roughly in line with 
the overall rise of  government. Social security, of  course, became steadily 
larger as a growing portion of  the labor force became eligible for benefits 
upon retirement. 
In the 1960s, the federal government took the design and operation of grant 
programs a step further. Responding to a sense of  frustration with the lack 
of progress toward the attainment of certain basic social goals, including, for 
example, the elimination of poverty and the renewal of decaying center cities, 
it undertook the “War on Poverty.” The federal government enacted a whole 
series of grant programs that bypassed the states and, in some instances, even 
locally elected  officials in  an  attempt to  get  resources  “where they  were 
needed.” Individually tailored project grants went to cities or special groups 
on the basis of  approved grant applications. 
The emphasis of part of the War on Poverty was to encourage “maximum 
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possible, the national government officials in charge of the programs were in- 
terested not in increasing the power and size of state and local welfare systems 
but rather in putting resources and control directly into the hands of the recipi- 
ents. This brought federal officials into much closer contact with the “projects” 
that the money was intended to fund. Inevitably, it provided the national gov- 
ernment much greater control over the specific ways in which grant funds were 
used. This was particularly true where project grants were specifically intended 
to circumvent the established political hierarchy. In this sense, these programs 
went well beyond the New Deal framework. 
At the same time, the national government redoubled its efforts to support 
the traditional, New Deal social welfare system. This effort continued well into 
the Nixon years. Part of this came through an expansion of the old programs: 
AFDC rolls exploded, supplemental social security expanded benefits for the 
aged, blind, and disabled. Part of  this took the form of new programs: food 
stamps,  Medicare,  and  Medicaid.  Nixon’s  Family  Assistance  Plan,  which 
would have guaranteed all families with dependent children a minimum yearly 
income, was the most far-reaching proposal. It was not enacted by Congress, 
but it would have been a major change from the New Deal structure. At the 
same time the national government significantly increased its support for state 
and local government in a range of functions, including education, water and 
sewage, and natural resources. 
Not surprisingly (in retrospect at least), central intervention into the federal 
system eventually produced a strong reaction. Beginning in the late 1970s and 
especially under the new Republican administration in the 1980s, moves were 
initiated to cut back on the grant programs. This was typically described as an 
attempt to “return control of the programs to the states.” Narrowly targeted 
conditional grant programs were replaced by broad block grants that stipulated 
only very general areas in which the funds were to be used. Discretion in the 
employment of grant funds was supposed to devolve back to the states. More- 
over, these reforms were accompanied by a general reduction in the relative 
size of grants; in the 1980s, federal grants as a fraction of state-local revenues 
and spending declined. 
In the  early  1970s, another new  intergovernmental  structure was put  in 
place. The Nixon administration and the U.S. Congress introduced a quite dif- 
ferent sort of intergovernmental fiscal innovation: “general revenue sharing.” 
Under this program, the federal government distributed funds by formula to 
state and local governments with fairly loose restrictions on their use only at 
the local level. The objective of this program was to channel funds from the 
highly income-elastic federal revenue system to the state-local sector, where 
expenditure  “needs”  were  growing  rapidly-to  link  the  most  growth- 
responsive revenue sources to the most rapidly expanding forms of public ex- 
penditure. Revenue  sharing,  however, was  a short-lived program.  With the 
enormous federal deficits in the 1980s, the central government, not the states 
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were eliminated from the program in 1980, and with the support of the Reagan 
administration, the entire program was allowed to expire in 1986. 
This is curious in one respect. Revenue sharing in one form or another has 
played a major role in many federal countries such as Canada and Australia 
from very early days. Central government in these countries has been a basic 
and regular source of  revenues for provincial, state, and local governments. 
But in the United States such programs have little history. The New Deal, while 
introducing large-scale transfers of funds from the center, certainly did not do 
so in  a “hands-off‘’ fashion. In this sense, revenue sharing was not, in  any 
direct way, a child of the Great Depression. 
With the massive deficits at the central level, there has been considerable 
pressure to cut back on federal transfers to the states and localities. But this 
has not proved easy. Intergovernmental transfers are now a basic part of  the 
fiscal system; in 1992, for example, federal grants still accounted for over 20 
percent of state and local revenues. 
Most recently, attention has focused on nonfiscal forms of central interven- 
tion, namely, various regulatory measures that impose responsibilities on state 
and local governments but do not provide the financial assistance to carry them 
out. These “unfunded mandates” have been the source of much contention and 
debate. This is a complicated issue. Many  mandates seem well founded in 
terms of  needed regulation of  externalities (eg,  various environmental stat- 
utes). But others have a much less clear rationale. 
5.8  Intergovernmental Grants and the Growth of the Public Sector 
It is clear, in retrospect, that New  Deal programs were the vehicle for the 
widespread introduction and heavy reliance on intergovernmental  grants in the 
US. federal fiscal system. In addition to transforming the character of Ameri- 
can fiscal federalism, there is evidence in the public finance literature that this 
reliance on grants has made a significant contribution to the growth of  the 
public sector in the American economy. 
As we have seen, many New Deal programs had as their very purpose the 
expansion of public sector spending to create new jobs and income and to 
stabilize the economy. To  this end, they employed matching provisions that 
induced additional spending on the part of  recipient state governments. The 
purpose of these grants was emphatically not to supplant spending by state and 
local governments with federal funds. From this perspective, New Deal grant 
programs clearly played an important role in extending the size and scope of 
the public sector as a whole. 
But at the end of this century, we find that federal grants (and state grants to 
local governments as well) no longer have economic expansion as their objec- 
tive. Later grant programs are quite diverse in both form and purpose; most of 
them have aimed to provide fiscal support either for specific types of projects 
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tenance. In the case of revenue sharing, the basic objective was simply to pro- 
vide general purpose funds to state and local governments. Some of these pro- 
grams contained matching requirements for recipients, but many others have 
not. 
Basic economic theory has some interesting implications for the effects of 
intergovernmental grants on the size of the public sector. In the case of most 
nonmatching grants, for example, grant funds simply augment the resources 
of  the recipient community; they have no direct price effects, only income 
effects.” At the theoretical level, it has been established that such nonmatching 
grants have allocative and distributive effects that are no different than if these 
funds were distributed in a particular lump-sum fashion to the residents of 
the recipient jurisdiction (Bradford and Oates 197  1). In short, nonmatching 
intergovernmental grants are formally equivalent in aZE  their effects to a federal 
tax cut directly to the individuals in a community. In both cases, the measures 
simply increase the disposable income available to the community; in one case, 
the increased dollars show up in the public treasury and in the other in the 
pockets of the individual residents. But this should, in principle, make no dif- 
ference to the ultimate outcome. This suggests that such grants should have no 
expansionary effect on the public sector. If  the federal government collects 
taxes and redistributes the funds in the form of nonmatching grants to states 
and localities, then the negative income effects associated with the increased 
federal taxes should offset (approximately) the positive income effects from 
the rise in grants. Matching grants, in contrast, will have a net expansionary 
impact on the public sector since the income effect of the grants is accompa- 
nied by  a price effect (i.e., the grant effectively reduces the price of services 
that the recipient purchases). But nonmatching grants should, in principle, be 
nonex  pansionary. 
What is of interest here is the pervasive empirical finding in the public fi- 
nance literature that this prediction of the theory is flat-out wrong. Dozens of 
studies of the stimulative effects of intergovernmental grants find that not only 
matching grants but nonmatching grants as well have a highly stimulative ef- 
fect on the spending of recipients (Gramlich 1977; Hines and Thaler 1995). 
Based on income effects alone, we might expect nonmatching grants to state 
and local governments to induce an increase in spending on the order of  10 to 
15 cents on the dollar (representing roughly their share in national income). 
But econometric (and other types of survey) studies find time and again that 
such nonmatching grants result in much more in the way  of additional state- 
17. This proposition is true so long as the grant does not exceed the amount in total that the 
recipient would have spent on the program in the absence of the grant. Moreover, even matching 
grants will have only income effects if they  are closed ended (i.e., if matching stops at  some 
prescribed level of spending by the recipient) and  if recipients’ spending exceeds the sum for 
which they are  eligible at  the margin for additional matching funds. Many matching grant pro- 
grams in the United States are,  in fact, closed ended in structure, and the evidence suggests that 
in the great majority of the cases recipients spend more than the sum necessary to exhaust their 
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local spending, typically on the order of about 50 cents per dollar of additional 
grant monies. This anomaly has become known in the public finance literature 
as the “flypaper effect” (i.e., “money sticks where it hits”). And there is now a 
body of papers that seek in various ways to reconcile these empirical findings 
with the basic theory of intergovernmental  grants (see Hines and Thaler 1995). 
For our purposes, this large empirical literature is important because it sug- 
gests that intergovernmental grant programs have had a substantial expansion- 
ary impact on the level of overall public spending. Additional federal taxes that 
are transformed into intergovernmental grants (even nonmatching grants) do 
not constitute a wash in terms of their impact on the size of the public sector. 
It is not easy to estimate the magnitude of  this effect, as this would, in prin- 
ciple, require a detailed model of how these grants have influenced the growth 
over time of the state and local sectors. But we offer a simpler and admittedly 
crude calculation. If we take at face value the econometric estimates of  the 
stimulative impact of intergovernmental grants, a conservative estimate would 
be that an average dollar of grants results in about 50 cents of additional state- 
local expenditure and about 50 cents of tax relief at the state and local levels.’s 
Since federal grants account for about 20 percent of  state-local revenues, this 
would suggest that state-local budgets in the aggregate are (at a minimum) 
about 10 percent larger than in the absence of these grant revenues. We do not 
intend this crude result to be taken as a serious effort to measure the effect of 
federal grants on state and local governments. Our intent is rather to make the 
point that in the process of transforming the character of the American federal 
system into one of  cooperative federalism through an extensive reliance on 
intergovernmental  grants, the New Deal also introduced a fiscal structure more 
conducive to overall growth of the public sector. 
5.9  The Legacy of the New Deal 
The New Deal has had a lasting impact on the structure of American govern- 
ment. As we have seen, one dimension of this impact was to create a much 
larger and more active role for the central government. To get a clearer sense 
of this, we see in figure 5.1 the federal, state, and local shares in public expen- 
diture excluding national defense and interest on the federal debt. This measure 
of fiscal shares (as discussed earlier) avoids some of the disruptions produced 
by  wartime and required payments on the national debt. It is interesting to 
subject these data to some simple econometric scrutiny. It is clear from looking 
at the graph that the federal share has risen over the course of the century. In 
fact, if we simply regress the federal share of public expenditures on time, we 
find that 
18. See Hines and Thaler (1995) for a summary of these estimates. This is a conservative esti- 
mate in that it is based on the measured impact of  nonmatching grants: the stimulative effect of 
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(1)  Federal share = -  4.5 + .0025Time,  R2 = .75, 
(6.3)  (6.8) 
where the numbers in parentheses are absolute values of the t-statistics. The 
estimated equation confirms the growth in the federal share and indicates that 
on average the federal share of the public budget has increased over this period 
by about 1 percentage point every four years. 
But the path of the federal share in figure 5.1 also suggests that its growth 
has not been very regular. In fact, a large increase in this share seems to have 
occurred during the New Deal years. To account for this, we introduce into the 
equation a dummy variable that takes on a value of zero for those years before 
1934 and a value of one for 1934 and thereafter. This yields 
(2)  Federal share =  -2.5  + .0014Time + .091Dummy,  R2 =  .85. 
(2.7)  (2.9)  (2.9) 
We  thus find that a “regime shift’’ took place during the New Deal period that 
increased the federal fiscal share by an estimated 9 percentage points. In addi- 
tion, there remains a statistically significant trend over time toward greater fis- 
cal centralization. But this effect is much smaller than in equation (1): the 
federal share now took about seven years to grow by  1 percentage point over 
the period under study. Moreover, if  we return to figure 5.1, this process of 
continuing centralization appears to have its source in the New Deal years; 
there is no increase at all evident in the federal share prior to 1934. Thus, the 
data suggest that the New Deal programs both increased fiscal centralization 
and, at the same time, set in motion a process of further centralization. 
The basic theory of fiscal federalism can provide a partial explanation for 
this trend toward greater fiscal centralization. The motivation behind the as- 
signment of functions to local, state, and national governments is different for 
the allocative function of providing basic public goods and services (such as 
education, roads, and police and fire protection) than it is for the redistributive 
function of providing support for low-income households (Oates 1972, chap. 
1; 1994). Decentralized levels of government have as their primary economic 
role the provision of levels of “local” public goods that are tailored to the par- 
ticular preferences and circumstances of their own jurisdictions. In contrast, 
providing assistance to the poor requires a more substantial central presence. 
A local government, for example, that attempts to redistribute income aggres- 
sively from wealthy to poor households immediately creates incentives for res- 
ident high-income families to move elsewhere and for poorer families to mi- 
grate into the jurisdiction. It is easy to show that such mobility can readily 
undermine the achievement of local redistributive objectives and will, in gen- 
eral, result overall in suboptimal levels of support for the poor (see, e.g., Brown 
and Oates 1987). The implication is that in a federal system, the central govern- 
ment must play a major role in the design and financing of  assistance to the 
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Since the New Deal had poor relief as one of its major objectives, it is not 
surprising to find that the introduction of needed redistributive programs in- 
volved an  increased degree of  centralization of  the public sector. The New 
Deal, as we have seen, introduced a variety of major welfare programs includ- 
ing social security and categorical assistance programs such as OAA, aid to 
the blind, and ADC (the predecessor to AFDC). As programs like AFDC grew 
in importance in later years, we find that the increased public role in income 
redistribution manifests itself in part in an increased degree of fiscal central- 
ization. 
Income maintenance programs could, in principle, be wholly centralized, 
with  a centrally designed set of  rules and benefits administered uniformly 
across jurisdictions. But, as we have seen, the New Deal took another course. 
The political setting for these programs was such that state and local officials 
demanded and got an active role in the specification of various key parameters 
for these programs (e.g., support levels) and for their administration, while the 
central government set up general guidelines and provided the bulk of  the 
funds in the form of matching grants. The political economy of the new redis- 
tributive programs took the form of a cooperative enterprise between the vari- 
ous levels of government that has proved quite durable.19 
The New Deal, however, was not the progenitor of all the changes in govern- 
ment structure since 1940. The New Deal was financed through national bor- 
rowing as much as through tax revenues. As a result, the changes in fiscal 
structure occurred largely on the expenditure side at the national level; it was 
at the state and local levels that new forms of taxation emerged in the 1930s. 
Not until World War  I1 with the advent of  income tax  withholding did the 
national revenue structure take new shape. 
A whole range of grant programs was begun in the 1960s that did not follow 
the New Deal pattern. These varied in their intent and structure, but typically 
the national government assumed much more direct control over the adminis- 
tration of the programs. The War on Poverty programs that cut state and even 
local governments out of the process are, by and large, gone now. The general 
revenue-sharing program is also gone. Although there was a move to consoli- 
date conditional project grants into looser block grants for general purposes, 
block grants today are a relatively modest part of  the fiscal system. For the 
most part, experiments in intergovernmental programs over the past 30 years 
that have not followed the New Deal pattern have not stood the test of time. 
We  have argued that the New  Deal pattern of  intergovernmental relations 
was the result of the struggle between state and national governments, and also 
between the president and Congress, for control over these programs. Ever 
since the New Deal, Congress has shown less inclination to locate either ad- 
19. However, certain recent changes in the structure of welfare programs aim at shifting more 
of the responsibility for poor relief back to the states and changing the form of federal support 
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ministrative or financial control at the state level. As a result, the national gov- 
ernment has continued to experiment with a wide range of intergovernmental 
forms. State and local governments, however, still want the substantial auton- 
omy they were given in the New Deal programs. And they have effectively 
lobbied for a continuation of New Deal programs, albeit with growing com- 
plaints about unfunded mandates, and kept those programs in existence. 
A widely misunderstood result of all that happened during and since the 
New Deal is the notion that it was only the federal government that grew during 
the  1930s. In  1927, state own revenues were 2.1 percent of GNP, and local 
own revenues were 6 percent of GNP. In  1940, state own revenues were 5 
percent of GNP, and local own revenues were 5.8 percent of  GNP. During 
the 1930s neither state nor local governments became smaller relative to the 
economy, and state governments grew. In 1992, state revenues were 7 percent 
of GNP, and local revenues were 6.1 percent. 
Although the share of total fiscal activity at the local level declined sharply 
during the New Deal, the share at the state level actually rose. State expendi- 
tures were 13 percent of all government expenditures in 1927 and 17.5 percent 
in 1940. Rather than displacing state governments, the expansion of national 
government activity actually created incentives for state governments to ex- 
pand their roles. The New Deal legacy has arguably been stronger governments 
at all levels, not just the central government. This is the result of national gov- 
ernment programs that encourage, even demand, state and local participation 
in nationally funded programs. 
Even local governments, whose fiscal share has declined so sharply, con- 
tinue to play the major role in the actual delivery of most major domestic pub- 
lic services (see figure 5.1). The New Deal was clearly the time during which 
the national government came into prominence in the domestic sphere, but the 
way in which this took place has led to a cooperative form of federalism involv- 
ing active roles for all three levels of government. The relative importance of 
the three levels may have varied at times over the past 50 years, but as we 
approach the close of the century, all three seem well entrenched in an active, 
if sometimes contentious, public partnership. 
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